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Why One Size Does Not Fit All
Introduction
The 27 EU Member States have very differ-
ent approaches to wage settlement. These 
differences are deeply rooted in national and 
historical traditions, different institutions and 
practices. Many EU Member States have intro-
duced a minimum wage by law and some have 
not - and the process of determining the wage 
level varies considerably. The EU Member 
States also have very different labour market 
and welfare systems, including different so-
cial and taxation systems. Consequently, it’s 
difficult to apply a one-size-fits-all European 
minimum wage in 27 fundamentally different 
systems.
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Wages and wage settlement are key 
features in any labour market. Yet 
wage formation is a relatively com-
plicated process in most countries, 
involving negotiations and regulations 
(Jørgensen 2002). A range of factors 
must be taken into account such as 
productivity, company budgets, the 
rate of the inflation, economic growth, 
labour supply and demand, rates of 
unemployment and employment, the 
general health of the economy and 
especially the strength and involve-
ment of the social partners.
The 27 EU Member States have 
developed very different solutions to 
labour market regulations, including 
wage settlement. These differences 
are deeply rooted in historical tradi-
tions, institutions and practices, many 
of which date back to the early industrialisation in the late 
1800rds. This led to the creation of different industrial rela-
tions systems. (Crouch 1993; Traxler et al 2003; table 1).   
When it comes to wage settlement, one of the key differ-
ences between EU Member States when it comes to wage 
settlement is the level of involvement of the social partners 
and the role of the state. 
In most EU Member States, wage floors set a lower 
boundary to wage distribution. With the exception of 
Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Italy and Sweden, this is 
usually done through a national statutory minimum wage 
 (Eurofound 2019). 
Although we can identify different clusters of countries 
with similar industrial relations systems (cf. table 1), each 
country is unique when it comes to wage settlement. Re-
search also shows great variations across sectors and even 
regions within each EU Member State (Bechter et al 2012). 
In many EU Member States, different extension mecha-
nisms also exist in order to broaden the coverage of collec-
tive agreements by law. In France e.g. erga omnes clauses 
mean that all employees are covered by the collective 
agreement that applies to companies within certain geo-
graphical areas and sectors (Liukkunen, 2019). 
In the Nordic countries, minimum wages are set by collec-
tive agreements at the sectorial level, negotiated volun-
tarily by the social partners with little or no intervention 
from the state. Here the state does not provide a statutory 
minimum wage (Høgedahl 2020).
Tabel 1 – European industrial relations clusters
Source: Eurofound, 2017
Nordic Centre-west South West Centre-east
Industrial relations 
regime
Organised 
 corporatism
Social partnership State-centered Liberal pluralism
Transition 
economies
Bargaining style Integrative Distributive/conflict-oriented Acquiescent
Employee 
 representation
Union-based
/high coverage
Dual-channel
/high coverage
Variable/mixed Union-based/Small coverage
Predominant level of 
collective bargaining
Sector Sector/company Company
The differences in the European 
labor market systems
Wage settlement is a complicated process and Member 
States have found different solutions based on different 
needs, historical traditions and institutions creating differ-
ent industrial relations systems as a consequence.
A.
European industrial relations clusters
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In general, minimum wage floors in the EU Member States 
are implemented by either collective bargaining, different 
kinds of extension mechanisms or by a statutory minimum 
wage (Eurofound 2019; Müller & Schulten; 2019). 
In most EU countries, the minimum wage is determined by 
legislation, i.e. a statute or a regulation. However, there are 
great differences in the way this process works. 
In most EU Member States, the social partners are con-
sulted but the level of involvement varies a great deal. In 
some countries, the level is set on 
the basis of bargaining between the 
social partners (Belgium, Estonia and 
Greece). In other countries, the level 
is set through tripartite arrangement 
(Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia), where 
the governments decide if the social 
partners fail to come to an agreement. 
In some EU Member States, such as 
France and Spain, the minimum wage 
The differences in wage 
 structures and wage levels
Wage levels and wage structures vary considerably across EU Member States. 
Countries with a high wage equality and decent standard of living have strong 
collective bargaining and social dialogue and a low share of non-standard 
employment.
B.
Median wage 60 pct. median Minimum wage
Source: Eurostat. The calculations are based on structural statistics (2014) and projected labour cost indexed to a 2019 level.
Figure 1 – Median wage, 60 pct. median wage and minimum wage (if applied), 2019 in Euros
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is automatically adjusted and indexed 
according to price and wage levels. 
The Nordic EU Member States, Aus-
tria, Cyprus and Italy do not have a 
statutory minimum wages. Looking at 
the wage structure and wage levels, 
research clearly shows a rather com-
pressed wage structure in the Nordic 
countries.  Blue collar workers with 
low levels of education in the Nordic 
countries have rather high wage levels 
compared to other EU Member States 
(Ibsen et al 2019). Consequently, the share of employees 
with low wages - i.e., those who earn less than two thirds of 
the national median wage - is rather low.
In the OECD Outlook 2018, Denmark is the top performer 
in Earnings Quality (OECD 2018). Research also connects 
this wage equality with independent, collective bargain-
ing conducted voluntarily by strong social partners (OECD 
2019; Borjas & Van Ours 2010). Research clearly shows that 
wage systems based on collective bargaining have a lower 
number of people earning the lowest wages compared to 
the statutory minimum wage system (Bosch et al. 2019). 
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The level of collective labour market 
representation varies considerably 
across the EU Member States. In 
terms of the share of employees who 
are members of a trade union (trade 
union density) the numbers range 
from 4 pct. in Estonia to 67 pct. in 
Denmark (cf. figure 2).   
   
Another indicator of collective rep-
resentation is the extent of collective 
bargaining coverage, which indicates 
the share of employees who are cov-
ered by a collective agreement. 
Figure 3 shows that the EU Member States whose bargain-
ing systems can be described as multi-employer bargaining 
have the highest collective bargain ing coverage. Here 
negotiations mainly take place at sectoral or branch level 
(e.g. Germany), or in some cases at a cross-sectoral level 
(e.g. Belgium and, until recently, Finland). 
Other crucial characteristics of extensive collective bar-
gaining systems are, first, the existence of legal extension 
mechanisms that ensure that collective agreements also 
apply to companies with no collective agreement; and sec-
ond, the existence of broad-based bargaining parties like 
in Denmark and Sweden, where no legal extension mech-
anism exists and where high bargaining coverage solely 
rests on the organisational strength of the social partners 
(ETUI 2019). 
Research shows a correlation between strong social 
partners, multi-employer bargaining and high productivity, 
which facilitates wage increases (Bosch et al. 2019; Grim-
shaw et al. 2017).
By contrast, countries with single-employer bargaining 
agreements have the lowest organisation rates. This is the 
case in a number of central and eastern European coun-
tries, such as the Baltic states, Hungary and Poland (cf. 
figure 3). 
Some areas are not covered by collective bargaining in the 
Nordic countries. However, this does not mean that these 
areas do not have minimum wage floors or that they have 
a low quality of work. In fact one of the reasons why the 
collective bargaining coverage in Sweden and Denmark is 
not higher is because many employ-
ees in the private sector with a higher 
education prefer individual wage 
settlement (Høgedahl & Jørgensen 
2019). However, research also shows 
that collective agreements often have 
‘spill-over effects’ to the uncovered la-
bour market, even for employees with 
low levels of education (McLaughlin, 
2009). Companies without collective 
agreements will often refer to the 
wage levels set within sectoral agree-
ments in the face of competition to 
attract qualified employees.
Figure 2 – Union density in EU Member States 2018 (or latest year available), as a percentage of the workforce
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Figure 3 – Collective bargaining coverage in EU Member States, 2016 (or latest year available), 
as a percentage of the workforce 
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Note: No data available for Bulgaria and Cyprus
The differences in collective representation 
and involvement of social partners 
in wage settlement
C. The EU Member States have very different levels of collective representation in terms of employee 
and employer organisation rates and in collective bargaining coverage. The EU Member States also 
have different traditions in terms of the use of legal extension mechanisms enabling collective agree-
ments to apply to companies with no collective agreement. 
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The distribution and efficiency of a minimum wage sys-
tem depends, in large part, on the social welfare system in 
which it is embedded (Freeman 1996). The social security 
and taxation system are important in relation to the take-
home value of minimum wages (Lee & Saez 2012). In addi-
tion, wages are only part of the hourly cost of labour. All of 
the EU Member States have additional market-determined 
or collectively bargained benefits, ranging from contribu-
tions to private pensions to subsidized lunch breaks to paid 
vacations and holidays.
Some EU Member States also require employers to make 
national insurance contributions that depend on wages.  
Employers who are only required to pay a minimum hourly 
wage may reduce other benefits, which could potential-
ly reduce workers’ total payment. In short, wages - and 
minimum wages in particular - must be considered in the 
context of broader issues that also play a predominant role 
in the labour market, such as social security, safety and 
taxation systems.
The EU Member States have very different welfare state 
regimes, as illustrated in figure 4.
In the Nordic countries (Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark) the welfare  
and social benefit systems are mainly 
financed by income- and other taxes, 
creating a rather large redistribution 
(Andersen 2007). In other countries, 
such as Belgium, employers are more 
obligated to finance or co-finance 
many social benefits for their employ-
ees. 
In the conservative/corporatist model 
(Centre-West and Southern Europe), 
welfare services are dependent on 
social distribution instead of taxes. 
Social contributions are common in 
many continental countries but the 
financial burden for companies has 
been reduced during the last dec-
ades. The newest EU Member States 
(Centre-East Europe) are similar to the 
conservative model but with some 
distinct, institutional features (Ra-
packi et al 2020). In the Liberal welfare 
states (Ireland, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom) there is a low level of 
total state spending on social pro-
tection relying on the private market 
instead.   
The differences in social 
benefits and taxation systems
Figure 4 – Welfare state regimes in the EU
The welfare state regimes in Europe are based on rather different social 
benefit and taxation systems. The social security and taxation systems 
are important in relation to the take-home value of minimum wages. 
Consequently, setting statutory minimum wages fitting all EU Member 
States is extremely difficult.
Source: Esping Andersen (1990); Fenger (2007) 
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Conservative/Corporative
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Liberal/Anglo-Saxon
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Conclusions 
The 27 EU Member States have very different industrial 
relations – and welfare state systems. 
Wage settlement is a complicated process involving 
negotiations and regulations. These processes are deeply 
rooted in national and historical traditions, institutions and 
practices. 
Each EU Member State has its own unique way to secure 
minimum wage floors for workers, either by collective bar-
gaining, different kinds of extension mechanisms or by a 
statutory minimum wage. 
Another fundamental difference is the diverging levels of 
collective labour market representation, which is evident 
in the markedly divergent trade union densities and col-
lective bargaining coverages. 
It is also important to note that wages, and especially 
minimum wages, cannot be isolated from broader issues 
which also play a predominated role on the labour market 
including social security, protection – and taxation sys-
tems. Wages are only part of the hourly cost of labour and 
the take-home value of minimum wages must be seen in a 
broader context.
Together, the fundamentally different elements in the 27 
EU Member States’ industrial, labour market and welfare 
state systems make an effective one-size-fits-all mini-
mum wage for all EU Member States practically difficult.  
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